

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, *DE FATO*: SOME PARALLELS*

As was first pointed out by Gercke,¹ there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius, *de Platone* 1.12,² the treatise *On Fate* falsely attributed to Plutarch,³ Calcidius' *excursus* on fate in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*,⁴ and certain sections of the treatise *de Natura hominis* by Nemesius.⁵ Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius;⁶ recently however Dillon⁷ has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical — our actions are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable⁸ — he does *not* share certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul⁹ and the hierarchy of three providences.¹⁰ Since Albinus is actually known to

* This article is largely composed of material from my 1977 Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 'Studies in the *De fato* of Alexander of Aphrodisias; I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd, for his interest and advice.

¹ A. Gercke, 'Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus', *Rh. Mus.* 41 (1886), 266–91.

² Cited according to the edition of P. Thomas, *Apuleius: tres de philosophia libri* (Stuttgart, Teubner, 1970, reprint of edition of 1908–21).

³ Plutarch, *Moralia* 568 b–574 f; henceforth simply 'pseudo-Plutarch'. Cf. the commentaries of P. H. de Lacy and B. Einarson (Plutarch, *Moralia*, Loeb vol. 7, 1959) and of E. Valgiglio (*Pseudo-Plutarch De Fato*, Rome, 1964).

⁴ Chs. cxlii–cxc; cited according to the edition of J. H. Waszink, *Timaeus: Calcidius. Plato Latinus* IV, (London–Leiden, 1962). Cf. especially J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on fate: his doctrine and sources. Philosophia antiqua* 18, (Leiden, 1970).

⁵ xxxiv. 740 b–741 a, xxxviii 743 b–756 b, and xlv 796 a. References to Nemesius are by column number of *Patrologia Graeca* vol. 40, ed. J.-P. Migne, (Paris, 1863).

⁶ (Above, n. 1), p. 279; cf. W. Theiler, 'Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre', *Phyllobolia für P. von der Mühl* (Basel, 1946), p. 71, and den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 10. (Theiler's essay was reprinted in his *Forschungen zur Neuplatonismus*, Berlin, 1966, pp. 46–103; references are to the 1946 edition). In his edition of Calcidius Waszink argued that the common source was Numenius (pp. lviii f., cf. lxi f.), but in his *Studien zum Timaioskommentar des*

Calcidius i. Philosophia antiqua 12 (Leiden, 1964), p. 22, n. 2, he changed his position to agree with Theiler as far as the source of chs. cxlii–clix was concerned. Cf. also den Boeft, p. 129.

⁷ J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977), pp. 294 ff., 320, 337 f.

⁸ Albinus, *Didasc.* xxvi. 179. 7 ff. (cited from the edition by C. F. Hermann in *Platonis Dialogi* vol. vi, Leipzig, Teubner, 1902). Cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 a ff., Calcidius cl. 186. 13 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 765 ab; Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 273 f., 278 f., Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 294–7, 321–3, 413. Cf. also Nemesius xxxvii 749 b, taken as a reference to the Stoics by W. Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa. Library of Christian Classics*, 4 (London and Philadelphia, 1955), p. 404, but as a reference to Platonist doctrine by Theiler, op. cit., p. 79 (but cf. n.1) and by D. Amand (E. Amand de Mendieta), *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque* (Amsterdam, 1973; reprint of *Univ. de Louvain, Rec. de travaux d'hist. et de philol.*, 3rd ser., fasc. 19, 1945), p. 565. Cf. below, n. 31.

⁹ pseudo-Plutarch 568 e, Calcidius cxliv. 182. 16 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 753 b. Gercke (above n. 1), p. 270, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 296, 321 f.

¹⁰ Apuleius, *de Plat.* 1.12 96.2 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 572 ff., Nemesius xlv 793 b; not in Calcidius (but cf. Waszink's notes in his edition on 184.13 and 206.14–18, and id. in *Porphyre (Entretiens Hardt* 12, 1965) 66). Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 285 ff.; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 15 f.; Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 323–6.

have been a pupil of Gaius,¹¹ it seems that a common source (Σ) other than Gaius must be sought for the features found in the other texts cited but not in Albinus,¹² and that the doctrine of conditional fate itself – which is already suggested by certain Platonic texts, as the Middle-Platonists pointed out¹³ – derives from some source anterior to both Σ and Gaius.¹⁴

There are a number of parallels between the works cited – which will henceforth be described collectively as ‘the Middle-Platonist writers on fate’, since even those not themselves Middle-Platonists are influenced by the Middle-Platonic tradition¹⁵ – and the treatise *On Fate* of the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias.¹⁶ These parallels have led some scholars to assimilate the latter closely to the Middle-Platonic tradition, and even to speak of it as sharing a common source with the works mentioned above.¹⁷ However, it seems that insufficient attention has been paid to the details of the passages claimed as parallels and to the very marked divergencies between Alexander’s treatise and the Middle-Platonist works. I do not deny that there is a general similarity, in that both Alexander and the Middle-Platonists are attacking a Stoic determinist position while drawing to a considerable extent on the Stoics for material from which to construct their own positions;¹⁸ but many of the alleged parallels can be explained without the hypothesis of a common source, as due (i) to the identity of the positions that Alexander and the Middle-Platonists are *attacking*, rather than to any *anti-determinist* common source;¹⁹ or (ii) to the fact that

¹¹ Cod. Par. gr. 1962 fo. 146^v; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 70 and n. 2, Dillon, p. 267, cf. p. 308.

¹² Dillon, loc. cit. in n. 7. At pp. 404–7 Dillon tentatively suggests that the source (his ‘S’) for those features in Calcidius that do not derive from Adrastus may be Numenius’ associate Cronius.

¹³ Plato, *Republic* 617 e, *Phaedrus* 248 c (cf. pseudo-Plutarch 568 cd, Calcidius clii. 187.20, cliv. 189.4, Nemesius xxxviii 753 b, 756 b); also Plato, *Laws* 903 d ff. (However, the Middle-Platonists transfer to the consequences of choices made in *this earthly life* Plato’s remarks concerning choices made by the soul *outside* this life.) Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, and den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 30–4.

¹⁴ Cf., in general, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 337 f.

¹⁵ i.e. Nemesius and Calcidius (though the latter might indeed be regarded as a Middle-Platonist in spite of his later date); cf. Dillon, pp. 401 ff., and below nn. 197–202 on Calcidius’ sources.

¹⁶ Cited according to the edition of I. Bruns, *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II. ii (Berlin, 1892). I am currently preparing a translation of and commentary on this work.

¹⁷ R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 86 (Alexander and Albinus); R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics*.

Philosophia antiqua 28 (Leiden, 1976), 16 f., n. 78 (the same); B. W. Switalski, ‘Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus’, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ed. C. Baeumker and G. F. von Hertling, 3.6 Münster, 1902), 94–6 (Alexander and Calcidius); Theiler (above, n. 6) pp. 65 f. and 66, n. 4 (Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius).

¹⁸ A. A. Long, ‘Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias *de fato* (I–XIV)’, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 267. For the Stoics as Alexander’s opponents cf. *ibid.* 247 and my comment, ‘Aristotelian and Stoic Necessity in the *de fato* of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 258, n. 24. Alexander, like Greek writers in general, does not use an expression for ‘free will’; he employs the expression τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, which I have rendered ‘responsibility’, used both by libertarians and by the Stoics, whose position is a ‘soft-determinist’ one (cf. n. 41). But for the libertarian character of Alexander’s position cf. Sharples, loc. cit. and p. 256, n. 22.

¹⁹ As for example with the Stoic arguments for determinism from divination (Alexander, *de fato* xxxi. 201.32, Calcidius clxi. 194.20–2) and from universal divine foreknowledge (Alexander, *de fato* xxx. 200.12; Calcidius clxi. 193.17); Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95 n. and Waszink, ad loc. Cf. also below, nn. 61, 71, 134, 225.

the alleged parallels are philosophical commonplaces;²⁰ or (iii), in the case of Calcidius and Nemesius, to the possibility, at least, that these later authors are combining material drawn directly or indirectly from Alexander with that drawn from Σ.²¹ To elucidate this I propose to discuss various alleged parallels in turn, considering also certain parallels between Alexander and other later authors.²² (Reference will be made, in addition to the *de fato*, to the last section of the *de anima libri mantissa* attributed to Alexander.²³ This draws on the *de fato* at certain points, but its authenticity is doubtful; I hope to discuss this elsewhere²⁴).

I

The Middle-Platonist authors illustrate their doctrine of conditional fate by the example of the oracle given to Laius, cited from Euripides, *Phoenissae* 18–20:

μη σπείρε τέκνων ἄλoκα δαμώνων βία ·
εἰ γάρ τεκνώσεις παῖδ', ἀποκτενεῖ σ' ὁ φύς,
καὶ πᾶς σὸς οἶκος βήσεται δι' αἵματος.²⁵

Alexander too cites the last two of these lines in his discussion of prophecy in *de fato* xxxi.²⁶ But the context is rather different; whereas the Middle-Platonists cite the lines to illustrate their own theory, Alexander does so in the course of an attack on the position of his determinist opponents. Critics of the determinist position claim, he says, that it is incompatible with prophecy and point out that oracles imply the possibility of averting the consequence by acting in a certain

²⁰ As with the definition of the contingent as what can happen or not (Alexander, *de fato* ix. 175.2, Calcidius clxii. 195.16 f.; Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96) and the discussion of chance, based, both in Alexander and in the Middle-Platonic tradition, on Aristotle (cf. the commentators in nn. 3–4): Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.5–6, *Metaph.* Δ 30 1025^a14 ff., 24 ff., Alexander, *de fato* viii. 172.17 ff., xxiv. 194.15 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 571 e ff., Calcidius clviii 191.18 ff., Nemesius xxxix. 761 b ff. Cf. Switalski, p. 96; Waszink, 193.5n.; B. Domański, 'Die Psychologie des Nemesius', *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters* (cf. n. 17), 3.1 (1900), 159, n. 1; Sharples, 'Responsibility, Chance and Not-Being (Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* 169–172)', *BICS* 22 (1975), 46 and nn. 86–9. Cf. also below, § II.

²¹ The question of Calcidius' and Nemesius' sources is too complex to discuss here in full; but cf. Waszink, pp. xxxv–cvi of his edition of Calcidius, den Boeft (above, n. 4) pp. 128–37, and H. A. Koch, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Nemesius von Emesa* (Berlin, 1921), especially pp. 22–49. Cf. also below, nn. 197–202, 227–9.

²² On Alexander's later influence cf. especially G. Théry, 'Autour du décret de 1210: II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique', *Bibliothèque*

Thomiste (Kain) 7 (1926), 13 ff.

²³ *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II, i, ed. I. Bruns (Berlin, 1887), 179.24–186.31.

²⁴ I am grateful to Professor Long for discussion on this point. Reference will also be made to other sections of the *mantissa* and of the other collections of short discussions attributed to Alexander; here too questions of authorship are raised, and my use of 'Alexander' for the author in such cases is purely for convenience and does not indicate that the passages in question are authentic works of Alexander, though they draw on his work and are probably in any case by authors closely associated with him. Cf. in general the discussions referred to in Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 53, n. 28, and addenda, *ibid.* 23 (1976), 72.

²⁵ Albinus, *Didasc.* xxvi. 179.13 ff., Calcidius cliii. 188. 9 f. Cf. also Maximus Tyrius 13.5, p. 164 Hobelin (Leipzig, Teubner, 1910) and Origen in *SVF* 2.957; but cf. n. 32).

²⁶ XXXI. 202.10 f. Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95; Witt (above, n. 17), p. 86; M. Dragona-Monachou, 'Providence and fate in Stoicism and Prae-Neoplatonism', *ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ* (Athens) 3 (1973), 271, n. 45. Cf. also P. L. Donini, *Tre studi sull' aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C.* (Padua, 1974), p. 86, n. 8.

way, citing this as an example; his opponents, he asserts, do not reply by saying that Apollo did not know that Laius would disobey, but rather point out that if the oracle had not been given the subsequent misfortunes would not have occurred. Laius would not, once he *had* disregarded the oracle's warning, have attempted to destroy Oedipus by exposing him; and Oedipus would not then have failed to recognize Laius and slain him.²⁷ Consequently, Alexander claims, his opponents make Apollo responsible for all that happened; which is impious.²⁸

Chrysippus, we know, used, not indeed the oracle given to Laius, but another part of the same story to illustrate his doctrine of 'co-fated' events;²⁹ it is fated that Laius will have a son, but that does not mean that he will have one whether he sleeps with Jocasta or not.³⁰ It seems likely, however, that he did also make the point that Laius would not have been slain by his son if he had not disobeyed the oracle. (This is simply another application of the doctrine of 'co-fated' events; there is indeed a close connection between this and the Middle-Platonist doctrine of conditional fate,³¹ with the difference – crucial from a libertarian point of view – that for the Stoics the initial act is itself fated, while for the Middle-Platonists it is not.³²) That Chrysippus did also make this point is suggested by Oenomaus;³³ moreover, we know from Diogenianus³⁴ that Chrysippus pointed out that – once the oracle had been disobeyed³⁵ – the attempts of Oedipus' parents to escape their prophesied fate came to nothing, which suggests an interest on Chrysippus' part in the Oedipus story as a whole. Moreover, Carneades

²⁷ xxxi. 202.5–25.

²⁸ xxxi. 202.25 ff.; ποιητήν, 203.1.

²⁹ SVF 2.956–7, 998. Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51, n. 2; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 120 f. Below, n. 42.

³⁰ SVF 2.956; cf. Origen in SVF 2.957 (where however the names are not given – perhaps because they have already been used to make another point; cf. n. 25) and (also without the names) Diogenianus in SVF 2.998, p. 292.34.

³¹ Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 73 f.; Valgiglio (above, n. 3), p. XXIX, and 'Il fato nel pensiero classico antico', RSC 16 (1968), 61 f. and n. 50; Long (above, n. 18), p. 267; Dragona-Monachou, loc. cit. (above, n. 26).

³² Theiler, Valgiglio, locc. cit. Everything is *in* fate, but not everything *according to* fate; Albinus xxvi. 179.2 f., pseudo-Plutarch 570 e, cf. 570 bc. Contrast, however, Maximus Tyrius, for whom Apollo knew Laius' character and knew that he would disobey (13.5 p. 164 Hobein; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51).

³³ SVF 2.978; Theiler, loc. cit. Admittedly, at SVF p. 284.31 ff. Oenomaus seems to be referring to a view which takes Laius' initial action to be *free*, which might suggest that he is attacking Platonists rather than Stoics; but he only mentions Chrysippus, Democritus, and 'prophets' as his opponents (*Patr. Gr.* 21.437 bc), and 284.28–30 seems to correspond to 284.25 and 27, which do

refer to Chrysippus. Oenomaus has, before the passage at 284.31, been attacking the claim to predict *Oedipus'* action as absurd (*Patr. Gr.* 21.437d), and in this context it is a useful objection to bring against Chrysippus that he is inconsistent in allowing Laius to be responsible for *his* action and yet regarding the oracle as valid so that *Oedipus'* action is predictable. However, for Chrysippus responsibility for an action is not removed by the fact that it is determined and can be predicted (see below) – a point that Oenomaus ignores.

For conditional oracles cf. Servius in SVF 2.958; and on the possibility, in a deterministic context, of taking precautionary action as the result of a prophecy cf. Cicero, *de div.* 2.20 f., 24, Seneca, *nat. quaest.* 2.37, and Diogenianus in SVF 2.939, p. 270.29; J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leiden, 1970), p. 145.

³⁴ SVF 2.939, p. 270.39 ff.

³⁵ This qualification is not in Diogenianus, but seems necessary; the outcome is equally fated before and after Laius' disobedience, but nevertheless it is for Chrysippus on Laius' disobedience that the outcome depends (though not, presumably, in a sense that removes Oedipus' responsibility for his action). Diogenianus does not point out, either, that Laius' attempt to escape his fate was not only ineffective but self-defeating (cf. n. 27 above).

may well have had the specific example used by Chrysippus in mind in arguing that Apollo could not foretell Oedipus' slaying of Laius even if it was true that it would occur.³⁶

Alexander's claim that, for his determinist opponents, Apollo must have known that Laius would disobey the oracle³⁷ is justified; he does not indeed present this as their explicit assertion, only as something that they do not deny,³⁸ but it follows in any case from their assertion that the gods know everything.³⁹ The Stoics argued for determinism from divination, which is closely linked with divine foreknowledge.⁴⁰ But for Chrysippus we are still responsible for our actions even though they are predetermined.⁴¹ The doctrine of 'co-fated' events was advanced as an argument against fatalism and for human responsibility: even though everything is fated, some things still depend on our (fated) actions.⁴² Consequently, for Chrysippus, Laius will be responsible for his disobedience of the oracle and for its consequences even if it was predetermined that he would disobey and even if Apollo knew that he would. Alexander however has tendentiously, and characteristically, ignored this point as depending on a notion of responsibility which he does not himself accept.⁴³ (It might indeed still be objected against Chrysippus that, even if Laius' disobedience is something for which he himself is responsible, if Apollo *knows* that Laius will disobey he is in effect gratuitously setting a trap for him; but, apart from the fact that the Stoics would not necessarily have found the idea of the gods inflicting trials on men repugnant,⁴⁴ Chrysippus may well have followed the story according to which the oracle's warning was a punishment for Laius' kidnapping of Chrysippus son of Pelops.⁴⁵)

It is true that Alexander represents the oracle as introduced *not* by Chrysippus himself but by critics of determinism.⁴⁶ However, Chrysippus himself may well have taken over an example used by his critics and used it in expounding his own position; it may be remarked, too, that it would suit Alexander's case to present the example as giving rise to difficulties for the determinist position rather than as used by Chrysippus himself to illustrate his own views. Since Alexander presents his opponents simply as supporters of determinism, rather than referring to Chrysippus specifically, it cannot perhaps be ruled out that the critics of determinism to whom he refers are Middle-Platonists who employ the example

³⁶ Cicero, *de fato* 33.

³⁷ Alexander, *de fato* xxxi. 202.13.

³⁸ At least with Bruns's conjecture <οὐ> φασιν in 202.12 as opposed to Usener's (cf. Bruns's apparatus). I am grateful to Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd for directing my attention to the details of expression of this whole passage.

³⁹ xxx. 200. 12 ff.

⁴⁰ Cf. *SVF* 2.939, 1191 f. S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London, 1959), pp. 65–71, Gould (above, n. 33), pp. 144 f.

⁴¹ This is shown above all by his 'cylinder-argument' (*SVF* 2.974, 1000); we are responsible for our actions as being their principal cause, even though they are determined by the combination of principal and auxiliary causes. Cf. Sambursky, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.; M. Pohlenz, *La Stoa* (ed. V. Alfieri, Florence,

1967) 1.209–11; A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974), pp. 166 f.;

P. L. Donini, 'Fato e volonta umana in Crisippo', *Atti dell' Acc. delle Scienze di Torino* 109 (1974–5), 1–44. For Chrysippus as a 'soft determinist' cf. J. B. Gould (above, n. 33), p. 149, n. 1, and p. 152, n. 3.

⁴² On this cf. especially Donini, op. cit., pp. 28–31.

⁴³ For similar tendentiousness on Alexander's part cf. Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 249–54, 262.

⁴⁴ Cf. Seneca, *de prov.* 4.5 ff., F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London, 1975), pp. 107 f.; *SVF* 3.177.

⁴⁵ Cf. H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 119–25.

⁴⁶ xxxi. 202.8 f.

of the oracle against the Stoics.⁴⁷ Even so, however, the use of the example is less striking than the fact that Alexander makes no positive reference to the conditional-fate doctrine as a way of retaining fate, in a sense, while rejecting determinism.⁴⁸ It is true that both he and Calcidius assert in similar terms that their own position preserves prophecy;⁴⁹ but in fact, while it is central to the Middle-Platonic view of fate that certain results follow inevitably from certain actions,⁵⁰ Alexander does not explain how his view preserves prophecy – his concern being with polemical *ad homines* argument rather than with developing a considered theory of his own.⁵¹ And indeed it is not clear that, even when Laius has disobeyed the oracle, his being slain by Oedipus *can* be an *inevitable* consequence in Alexander's view; he stresses that we have the possibility of acting against our nature, which he identifies with fate,⁵² and elsewhere emphasizes both that the development of character is our responsibility⁵³ and that even when it has developed our actions are not necessarily fixed by it.⁵⁴ Consequently it would seem that Oedipus could have refrained from killing Laius.⁵⁵ (Pack argues that, even if the outcome is not fixed, the gods may have greater knowledge than men of the probable outcome, and that thus the usefulness of prophecy is preserved;⁵⁶ but this argument does not appear in the *de fato*, though it is present in the *mantissa*.⁵⁷)

II

Both Alexander and Albinus argue that determinism is incompatible with men's being praised and blamed for their deeds.⁵⁸ However, this is a commonplace of

⁴⁷ On the contrast between the positions of these two groups cf. above, n. 32.

⁴⁸ Cf. further below, § III.

⁴⁹ Alexander, *de fato* xxxi. 201.30, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρούμεθα τὸ ἀπὸ μαντικῆς χρησιμὸν, ὃ γίνεται τῷ δύνασθαι τινα καὶ φυλάσασθαι τι, μὴ φυλαξάμενον ἂν μὴ συμβουλευσαντος τοῦ θεοῦ; Calcidius CLVII 191.8 ff., 'salva est, opinor, divinatio, ne praesagio derogetur auctoritas; potest quippe praescius tali facta informatione fati consilium dare aggrediendi vel non aggrediendi, recteque et rationabiliter mathematicus originem captabit instituendi actus ex prosperitate siderum atque signorum, ut, si hoc facta est, proveniat illud.' Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96; Waszink, ad loc.

⁵⁰ Contrast Oenomaus in *SVF* 2.978, who finds it implausible that Apollo should know the consequences of Laius' disobedience but not whether he would disobey (above, n. 33).

⁵¹ Cf. *de fato* xxxi. 201.30; also x. 176.27 ff. (on the reading at 177.1 f. cf. O. Apelt, 'Die kleinen Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias', *Rh.Mus.* 49 (1894), 61–3, and H. Langerbeck, 'Zu Alexander von Aphrodisias *de fato* X', *Hermes* 71 (1936), 473 f.), *mantissa* 179.16 ff., and below, n. 186.

⁵² *de fato* vi. 170. 9 ff. (even if there

are difficulties in Alexander's position here; cf. my remarks at *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 267–71).

⁵³ *de fato* xxvii. 197.3–199.7, xxix. 199.24–9. Cf. Donini, *Tre studi*, pp. 171–3, 180 f.; Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 44 and nn.

⁵⁴ *de fato* xxix. 199.29 ff.; cf. *mantissa* 174.27–35. Cf. Donini, *Tre studi* 176–184, Sharples, loc. cit.; also R. A. Pack, 'A passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the theory of tragedy', *AJPh* 58 (1937), 429 and n. 36.

⁵⁵ Granted, Oedipus failed to recognize Laius; even so, however, he presumably both could and should have refrained from killing the unknown person he had met.

⁵⁶ Pack, op. cit., pp. 428 f. At p. 429 Pack argues that *Laius* was predisposed to disobedience by his nature, but could have acted otherwise.

⁵⁷ *mantissa* 185.33; cf. Pack, p. 428 and n. 30. Cf. also *de fato* vi. 171.7, *mantissa* 186.8.

⁵⁸ Albinus, *Didasc.* xxvi. 179.7; for Alexander cf. n. 61. Witt (above n. 17), p. 86; Todd (above, n. 17), pp. 16 f., n. 78, the latter also citing Clement *Strom.* 1.17, *Patr. Gr.* 8.800 a. Cf. my comments at *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 89.

anti-determinist polemic in antiquity, being found already in Cicero;⁵⁹ and Chrysippus himself had to meet the analogous argument that punishment is incompatible with determinism, according to Gellius.⁶⁰ Three of the five passages referring to praise and blame that are cited from Alexander by Todd as parallels with Albinus are indeed from arguments that are presented by Alexander as those of his *opponents*,⁶¹ thus scarcely being evidence for an *anti-determinist* common source; and the verbal similarities between the passages of Alexander and Albinus cited by Todd seem no greater than those between these and other passages.⁶²

The connection of praise and blame with action that is not determined is also found in Calcidius;⁶³ the latter *may* be drawing on Alexander, but it hardly seems *necessary* to assert this – still less to postulate that both are closely dependent on a particular common source, as opposed to the general philosophical tradition – on the grounds of such a similarity. The same applies to other parallels between Calcidius and Alexander noted by Switalski and Waszink – the incompatibility of determinism with divine providence,⁶⁴ with prophecy⁶⁵ and with law,⁶⁶ and its alleged effect of producing inaction and idleness;⁶⁷ the last of these points, the ‘Lazy Argument’, was already countered by Chrysippus,⁶⁸ and the others may form part of the general tradition of anti-determinist polemic perhaps going back to Carneades.⁶⁹ Alexander and Calcidius do indeed give similar definitions of law,⁷⁰ but these apparently go back to Chrysippus himself⁷¹ and so *need* not reflect any anti-determinist common source.

⁵⁹ Cicero, *de fato* 40 (on which cf. P. M. Huby, ‘An Epicurean Argument in Cicero, *de fato* XVII–40’, *Phronesis* 15 (1970), 83–5); also Plutarch, *de Stoic. Rep.* 1050 c, pseudo-Plutarch, *de fato* 574 c. Praise and blame are connected with τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς by Epicurus, *ad Menoeceum* 133; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.1 1109^b30. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 574–8; Koch (above, n. 21), p. 37.

⁶⁰ *SVF* 2.1000, pp. 293.39, 294.3. Cf., for praise and blame, Diogenianus in *SVF* 2.998, p. 292.5; though the introduction of praise and blame here *could* be Diogenianus’ own.

⁶¹ *de fato* xxvi. 196.25 f., 197.1 f., xxxv. 206.1; and cf. ὡς καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν in Todd’s fourth passage, xxxiv. 206.28–30. He also cites xxxvi. 209.20–210.3; for Alexander’s own use of the argument one might also add xvi. 187.26 ff.

⁶² Cf. e.g. ἀναίποισ’ ἂν at Alexander, *de fato* xxiv. 206.30, xxxvi. 209.21, with Diogenianus, *SVF* p. 292.25; it does not occur in the passages of Albinus or Clement cited by Todd.

⁶³ clvii. 194.14–17, clxiii 196.3 ff.; cf. Waszink ad loc., Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96 fin. So too Nemesius xxxv. 741 b; Amand (above, n. 8), p. 568.

⁶⁴ Alexander, *de fato* xvii. 188. 1 ff.,

Calcidius clxv. 203.9–13; Waszink, ad loc. Nemesius, loc. cit.; Amand, loc. cit.

⁶⁵ Alexander, *de fato* xvii. 188.11–17, Calcidius clxxv. 211.9–13; Waszink, ad loc. (but the parallel hardly seems a close one). Cf. also above, n. 49.

⁶⁶ Alexander, *de fato* xxxvi. 209.4, 12, Calcidius clvii. 191.13; Switalski, p. 96. Nemesius, loc. cit. and xxxix. 765 b; Amand, p. 568 and n. 1.

⁶⁷ Alexander, *de fato* xvi. 186.30 ff., Calcidius clxv. 203.15 f.; Waszink, ad loc.

⁶⁸ Cicero, *de fato* 28–30.

⁶⁹ On the uselessness of law if all is determined cf. Amand, pp. 93 (Philo, *de prov.* 1.80) and 574 ff.; for the incompatibility of providence and prophecy with determinism, *ibid.*, pp. 584 f.

⁷⁰ Alexander, *de fato* xxxv. 207.8, . . . λογος ὁρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον; Calcidius clvii. 191.14, ‘. . . iussum sciscens honesta, prohibens contraria.’ Waszink, ad loc.; Switalski (above n. 17), p. 95.

⁷¹ Marcianus, *Dig.* 1.3.2; A. Gercke, ‘Chrysippea’, *Jahrbuch für klass. Phil.* Suppl. 14 (1885), 694. Moreover, whereas the definition in Calcidius forms part of his own argument against determinism (above, n. 66) that in Alexander is part of one that he gives as his opponents’ (xxxv. 207.5–21).

III

Far more striking, however, than the parallels between Alexander on the one hand and the Middle-Platonic tradition, particularly as represented by Albinus and pseudo-Plutarch,⁷² on the other are the differences. Alexander completely ignores the Platonist doctrine of conditional fate ('it is fated that, if p, then q'). In his discussion of the contingent in *de fato* ch. ix and in that of chance in chs. viii and xxiv (194.15 ff.) he concentrates on the contrast between what always happens and what sometimes happens and sometimes not, or between what happens usually and what happens rarely, neglecting the factors that may lead to this in each case; and in formulating his own doctrine of fate as the individual nature of each thing (ch. vi) he operates *not* (i) with the notion of a thing or situation which can, depending on which of several conditions obtains, develop in one or another of a number of possible ways ('given thing T, then, if p, T will ϕ , but if r, T will ψ ', where 'if p, T will ϕ ' has the form of 'if p, then q' above), but rather (ii) with the notion of what occurs in one way for the most part but admits of occasional exceptions ('given thing T, then T usually ϕ s, that being natural and in accordance with fate, but occasionally, because r applies, T will ψ instead').⁷³ In the latter formulation the concept of fate obscures the fact that what usually happens may be the result of certain conditions as much as what rarely happens; this concept of fate is in fact, as Professor Long has pointed out to me, less philosophically fruitful than the Middle-Platonist one.⁷⁴ When notion (i) is introduced into the last section of the *mantissa*, it gives rise to difficulties.⁷⁵ (It does occur in the discussion of the development of character in *de fato* xxvii, but this is simply because of the close dependence of this discussion on Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.5.⁷⁶)

Equally absent from the *de fato* are certain characteristic features of the Middle-Platonic discussions of possibility — the distinction between *δυνάμενον*, *δύναμις*, and *δυνατόν*;⁷⁷ the division of the possible (*δυνατόν*) into the necessary, which cannot be prevented or of which the opposite is impossible, and the contingent (*ἐνδεχόμενον*), which can be prevented or of which the opposite is not impossible;⁷⁸ and the further division of the contingent into that which occurs for the most part, that which occurs for the least part, and that which may

⁷² As pointed out above, parallels between Alexander and Nemesius or Calcidius admit of explanation, not in terms of a common source, but in those of the influence of Alexander on the later authors; further parallels between Alexander and these authors will be discussed below.

⁷³ Cf. Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 247–58 (the contingent); *BICS* 22 (1975), 47 (chance); *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 267–71, and Donini, *Tre studi*, pp. 171 f. (fate and nature).

⁷⁴ Cf. also my comments at *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 259 ff. and n. 37.

⁷⁵ *mantissa* 181.22–8; cf. Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 271–4.

⁷⁶ *de fato* xxvii. 197.3–17, xxix. 199.24–

29; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.5 1114^a13–21. Donini, *Tre studi*, pp. 171 f., 180 f.; Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 43 f.

⁷⁷ Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f – 571 a, Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; not in Albinus, Apuleius, or Calcidius. Dillon (above, n. 7), p. 323.

⁷⁸ Pseudo-Plutarch 571 b, Calcidius clv. 189.13 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; Gercke, *Rb.Mus.* 41 (1886), 274 f. Cf. also Boethius in *de interpretatione comm. ed. sec.* 234.3 ff. (ed. C. Meiser, Leipzig, Teubner, 1877 (ed. pr.) and 1880 (ed. sec.); henceforth 'Boethius comm. ed. pr./ed. sec.' simply); and id. *SVF* 2.201 fin. with the comments of B. Mates, *Stoic Logic*² (Berkeley, 1961), p. 37, n. 52.

equally well occur or not, the last-mentioned being the special province of human responsibility and choice.⁷⁹ Alexander does indeed give the definition of the necessary as that of which the opposite is impossible,⁸⁰ and, elsewhere than in the *de fato*, divides that which admits of something (ὀποδεκτικόν) into what does so necessarily and what does so contingently;⁸¹ in one of the *quaestiones* attributed to him we also find a division of the *impossible* into that of which the opposite is necessary and that which is prevented by the circumstances.⁸² But the absence of the characteristic Middle-Platonic classifications from the *de fato* is more striking. Alexander does there connect choice and responsibility with the contingent;⁸³ but the explicit connection with the contingent that can equally well occur or not, as contrasted with what occurs for the most or for the least part, is absent.⁸⁴

There are indeed indications that Alexander is not unaware of contemporary Platonic discussions. Merlan has suggested that, in his attempts to formulate an Aristotelian doctrine of providence, he is answering the criticisms of the Platonist Atticus;⁸⁵ and his doctrine of providence as concerned with species rather than individuals⁸⁶ may have a common source with pseudo-Plutarch's statement that secondary providence is concerned with species.⁸⁷ He cites with approval a distinction, which he attributes to Plato, between a supreme god who is alone ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ περιωπῇ τε καὶ νοήσῃ and secondary gods τὴν τῶν ἄλλων γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν ἐπιτροπεύοντας;⁸⁸ the image of the περιωπή comes from the *Politicus*,⁸⁹ but there both the supreme god and his subordinates are concerned

⁷⁹ Pseudo-Plutarch 571 cd, Calcidius clvi. 190.8 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 737 ab, 740 c-741 a. This doctrine reflects various Aristotelian texts (*de int.* 9, 19^a19, ^a38 ff., *an. pr.* 1.13, 32^b4 ff., *Metaph.* E 2, 1026^b20 ff., K 8, 1064^b28 ff.) and appears in Alexander, *in an. pr.* 1.13, 162 f. and *in top.* 2.6, 177.22 ff., without however the explicit connection of the middle class of the contingent with human choice; it is common later (Ammonius, *in de int.* 9, 142.1 ff., 151.9-152.11; Philoponus, *in an. pr.* 1.13, 151.27 ff.) Cf. den Boeft, op. cit., pp. 39, 45 n. 2, 99, and D. Frede, *Aristoteles und die 'Seeschlacht'* (*Hypomnemata* 27, Göttingen, 1970, pp. 60-2).

⁸⁰ *de fato* ix. 175.7 (cf. Domański (above, n. 20), p. 148, n. 1, Waszink, p. 189.19n.); cf. *quaest.* (Suppl. Arist. II. ii) ii.5, 52.5-7.

⁸¹ Alexander ap. Simplicius, *in de caelo* 359.1 ff.; M. Baltes, *Die Weltentstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpretationen* i (*Philosophia antiqua* 30, Leiden, 1976), 77.

⁸² *Quaest.* i.18, 31.18 ff. For the impossible as that of which the opposite is necessary cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* Δ 12, 1019^b23.

⁸³ Cf. *de fato* v. 169.6 ff., xii. 180.6 ff.; Pack (above, n. 54), pp. 423 f. For a more explicit expression of the point cf. *mantissa* 184.7-13; also 173.4-6.

⁸⁴ Contrast Domański, p. 155, n. 1. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41. The notion of the contingent that can equally well occur

or not is indeed implied at *de fato* vii. 172.7 f., ix. 175.17 (cf. Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 251, n. 8), 176.10; but it is *not* there especially connected with human choice; and at *in an. pr.* 1.13 162.32 f. Alexander describes the results of choice as usual though giving human actions as examples of what can equally well occur or not (cf. n. 79). Cf. also n. 205.

⁸⁵ P. Merlan, 'Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias', *Philologus* 113 (1969), 90 f., on *quaest.* 11.21 70.34.

⁸⁶ Alexander fr. 36 in J. Freudenthal, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles', *Abhandl. der Berliner Akademie* 1884, 1 (P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote* (Bibl. de la fac. de philos. et lettres de l'Univ. de Liège 99, Liège and Paris, 1942), 200), and P. Thillet, 'Un traité inconnu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur la providence dans une version arabe inédite', *L'Homme et son destin* . . . *Actes du ler congrès internat. de philos. médiévale* (Louvain, 1960), p. 321, lines 3-5.

⁸⁷ Ps.-Plutarch 573 a; cf. Nemesius xlv. 793 b. Cf. also Justin Martyr c. *Tryph.* 1.4, *Patr. Gr.* 6.473 c-476 a.

⁸⁸ fr. 2 in G. Vitelli, 'Due Frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia', *Festschrift Theodor Gomperz* (Vienna, 1902), pp. 90-3. (I am grateful to Professor Robert B. Todd for drawing my attention to this passage.)

⁸⁹ 272 e.

with the world in one half of the cosmic cycle and neither in the other.⁹⁰ Closer to the contrast drawn by Alexander here is *Timaeus* 42 e; but his statement is also reminiscent, on the one hand of the Middle-Platonic hierarchy of providences, itself based on this passage of the *Timaeus*,⁹¹ and on the other of the elevation of the First God above all concern with the world in Albinus⁹² and Numenius.⁹³

It is possible that Alexander was himself familiar with the Middle-Platonic discussions of fate, but deliberately avoided borrowing their most distinctive features because in the context of inter-school polemic he was reluctant to ally himself too closely with Platonists, even in order to attack the Stoics.⁹⁴ Even so, however, any talk of close affinities between Alexander and the Middle-Platonic tradition requires considerable qualification; and the striking feature of Alexander's treatise, by contrast with those of the Middle-Platonists, is its greater grasp of the important philosophical issues involved in the problem of determinism and its readiness to face them. Alexander does indeed tend to deal with different topics in a piecemeal fashion, and consequently does not advance a systematically developed position; it is not clear how the exceptions to fate discussed in chapter vi are related to chance, the contingent and human agency, discussed respectively in viii, ix, and xi ff.,⁹⁵ and the problem of causeless motion is discussed in different aspects in xv and in xxii-xxv without these being closely related.⁹⁶ Alexander's treatment of the problem of the determination of action by character⁹⁷ and his discussions of chance⁹⁸ and of the contingent⁹⁹ are open to objections. But he does at least *face* the question of the analysis of the processes leading to human action in the context of the issue of freedom and determinism, and the problem of uncaused motion;¹⁰⁰ pseudo-Plutarch, on the other hand, says nothing specifically concerned with the analysis of *human* action as such at all.¹⁰¹ The Middle-Platonists content themselves with stock descriptions of possibility and chance (responsible human action being a subdivision of the former) as the antecedents of the conditional connections of which they hold fate to be composed,¹⁰² without considering how freedom from determinism is thereby introduced; indeed their discussions of chance and possibility are open to the same objections on this score as are Alexander's,¹⁰³ without the compensating merits of his discussion.¹⁰⁴ (It must be admitted, however, that pseudo-Plutarch's treatise at least is explicitly only a preliminary

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Above, n. 10; Dillon (above, n. 7) p. 324.

⁹² X. 164.16 ff.; cf. Dillon, p. 282.

⁹³ Dillon, pp. 366-71.

⁹⁴ On inter-school polemic in general cf. Dillon, pp. 249 f.; but cf. below, §III fin.

⁹⁵ Pack's presentation of the *de fato* as 'a classification of causes' (above, n. 54), p. 418 is over-systematic (in spite of xxvii. 211.1 ff.). The dialectical, *ad homines* character of much of Alexander's discussion also plays a part here; above, n. 51.

⁹⁶ Cf. Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 42 and nn. 43, 45; 44-9.

⁹⁷ chs. xxvii-xxix; cf. also xv. 185.21-8 and *mantissa* 174.13-39. Donini, *Tre studi*, pp. 170-84, Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 43 f.

Above, nn. 53-4, 75.

⁹⁸ viii. 172.17 ff., xxiv. 194.15 ff.

Sharples, *BICS* 22 (1975), 46-9.

⁹⁹ ix. 175.16 ff. Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 247-58 and 265, n. 48.

¹⁰⁰ Above, nn. 96-7.

¹⁰¹ He does connect human choice with a particular class of the contingent (n. 79), but he does not analyse the processes leading to human action, in the context of the problem of freedom and determinism, in the same way as does Alexander (n. 97). (571 d hardly goes against this.) Cf. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41 on Nemesius.

¹⁰² Above, nn. 20 (chance), 79 (Aristotelian foundations of the Middle-Platonic discussion of the contingent).

¹⁰³ Above, nn. 98, 99.

¹⁰⁴ Above, nn. 96, 97, 100.

discussion, contenting itself with listing the arguments advanced by the supporters of determinism without attempting to answer the problems which they pose for a non-deterministic position;¹⁰⁵ and Albinus' treatment is a very summary one.) The shortcomings of the Middle-Platonic discussions of fate are well indicated by Dillon;¹⁰⁶ it will be clear however that I do not accept his view of Alexander's treatise: 'it is an assertion of the right of Aristotelianism to exist and to serve the state; the Stoics are branded as subversives and immoralists. *There is some attempt at philosophical argument* [my italics], but the general tone is "popular" and "rhetorical".'¹⁰⁷ Dillon's view seems to depend too heavily on the opening and closing chapters of the treatise and to disregard the fact that the references to the alleged practical implications of determinism are in the context of a philosophical discussion of which they form a legitimate part. For all his polemic concern and tendentiousness, much of Alexander's treatise is highly technical;¹⁰⁸ he may indeed have found himself writing a more technical treatise than he originally intended.

IV

In *de fato* xiii Alexander cites an argument (henceforth 'argument A') used by his opponents to preserve responsibility in a determinist system. Everything is given a characteristic type of behaviour by fate: that of stones is to fall, that of fire to heat, and that of living creatures to act in accordance with impulse (*ὁρμή*).¹⁰⁹ Actions by living creatures in accordance with impulse are their responsibility (are *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑωυτοῖς*) even though they are determined, by the combination of the agent's nature and the external circumstances, no less than is everything else.¹¹⁰ (An argument in some respects similar is also attributed by Alexander to his opponents in ch. xxxiv.¹¹¹)

Argument 'A' in some respects resembles Chrysippus' cylinder-argument;¹¹² however, while the point of the latter is that the principal cause of the behaviour of the cylinder and the human agent *alike* is their own nature rather than the external factors, for argument 'A' the *contrast* between living creatures that act in accordance with impulse and inanimate objects that do not is crucial.¹¹³ (The

¹⁰⁵ Pseudo-Plutarch, 574 cf.

¹⁰⁶ (Above, n. 7), pp. 211, 325.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 250.

¹⁰⁸ The latter part of ch. X (177.7 ff.) may be cited as an extreme case.

¹⁰⁹ *de fato* xiii. 181.15–182.8 (SVF 2.979). For fire heating cf. xi. 179.15, xiv. 183.11, 184.13, and with the examples at xiii. 181.19 cf. also xiii. 182.8 ff., xiv. 185.3 f., xv. 185.17 f., 28 ff., xix. 189.21 ff., xxxiv. 205.27 ff. (below, n. 111), xxxvi. 208.6 f., 23 ff. Cf. also D.L. 7.86, and, for impulse as characteristic of living creatures, SVF 2.714, 844.

¹¹⁰ xiii. 182.8–20. Cf. O. Rieth, *Grundbe-griffe der Stoischen Ethik (Problemata* 9, Berlin, 1933), pp. 144 ff.; V. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme*² (Paris, 1951), p. 193 and nn. 2, 3; S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London, 1959), pp. 63 ff.; A. A. Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.*

52 (1970), 260 ff. and *Problems in Stoicism* (London, 1971), pp. 180 ff.; P. L. Donini, *Atti dell' Acc. delle Scienze di Torino* 109 (1974–5), 32 ff.

¹¹¹ xxxiv. 205.24 ff. (SVF 2.1002); linked with ch. xiii by J. Guttman, 'Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Crescas . . .', *Jewish Studies in Memory of G. A. Kohut*, ed. S. W. Baron et al. (1935), p. 341, n. 21.

¹¹² Above, n. 41. Alexander's description of external causes as *συντελοῦντα* (xiii. 181.29) recalls *adiuvantia* in Cicero *de fato* 41 (SVF 2.974; cf. Donini, op. cit., p. 34); cf. also xxxiv. 205.29 (n. 111) with SVF 2.1000, p. 294.7 ff. (on which cf. Long, *Problems*, p. 197, n. 48, Donini, p. 13). Cf. also Bréhier, loc. cit., Theiler (above, n. 6), and Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 261; also below, nn. 126 ff., 142.

¹¹³ Cf. Long, op. cit., p. 263.

cylinder-argument should not indeed be taken as intended to suggest that there is *no* difference between the reactions of men to external stimuli and those of inanimate objects;¹¹⁴ but the contrast between them does not seem to be the central point of the argument.)

Against argument 'A' Alexander brings two principal objections. (i) The contrast between living creatures and inanimate objects where responsibility is concerned is arbitrary in the context of the determinist system; the living creature's impulse is no more a necessary condition of what is brought about by it than the nature of fire is a necessary condition of *its* effects.¹¹⁵ The determinist argument replaces what is *up to* living creatures (*ἐπί*) by what is brought about *by* fate *through* them (*διὰ*), reducing them, it is implied, to the level of instruments.¹¹⁶ And (ii) it is *rational* impulse, rather than just impulse, that is constitutive of responsibility.¹¹⁷

Arguments similar to 'A' are attributed to the Stoics, with similar examples to those in Alexander for the natural behaviour of various types of thing, by Nemesius¹¹⁸ and by Boethius;¹¹⁹ the argument is also it would seem alluded to by Plotinus,¹²⁰ but, being concerned in the passage in question to criticize the determinist position rather than first to state and *then* to refute it, he does not record the contrast between living creatures with impulse and inanimate objects without, but asserts that fire has impulse just as much as do living creatures — the implication being, as in Alexander, that the distinction between living creatures and inanimate objects has no meaning in the context of a determinist system.¹²¹ Nemesius too finds this distinction arbitrary¹²² and argues that the determinist position reduces man to the level of an instrument;¹²³ like Alexander, he refers to the determinist position in terms of what is brought about *by* fate *through* us.¹²⁴ (The last two points occur also in Calcidius;¹²⁵ but there is nothing else in the context that is reminiscent of argument 'A'.)

There are however differences between Nemesius and Alexander. Nemesius lays more stress on the point that, for the Stoics, it is only for acts in accordance

¹¹⁴ Cf. M. E. Reesor, 'Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy', *Phoenix* 19 (1965), 288 ff.; Long, op. cit., p. 262.

¹¹⁵ xiv. 183.5 ff., cf. xiii. 182.16 ff.; Long, op. cit., pp. 262 f., *Problems*, 196, n. 26.

¹¹⁶ xiii. 181.14, 182.12 ff. (quoted below, p. 258); cf. also 182.6–8, and xxxvi, 208.3, xxii. 192.7, xxxi. 203.13.

¹¹⁷ xiv. 183.21–185.7; Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 263 ff.

¹¹⁸ xxv. 744 a ff. (SVF 2.991); with the example of the plant (SVF 2, p. 290.26 f.) cf. Alexander, *de fato* xxxvi. 208.16 (above, n. 109).

¹¹⁹ *comm. ed. sec.* 195.10 f.

¹²⁰ 3.1, 7.14 ff.

¹²¹ It may be noted, however, that Aristotle regards the downwards movement of a stone as due to necessity in accordance with *φύσις* and *δρμη* (*An. Post.* 2.11, 94^b37 ff.). Seneca *nat. quaest.* 2.24.2 f. and 6.17.1 speaks of fire rising as going *where it wishes*

(A.-J. Voelke, *L'Idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme* (Paris, 1973), p. 107, n. 4).

¹²² SVF 2.991, p. 290.41 ff.; one might as well say that burning is *ἐπὶ τῷ πυρὶ* because fire burns by nature. Nemesius says that Philopator seems to suggest this (*παρεμφαίνων ἔοικεν*) in his *de fato* (cf. n. 132); the suggestion was presumably unintentional.

¹²³ xxxiv. 745 b (only partly in SVF).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*: οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δι' ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης γινόμενον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐστι. (But contrast 745 a, δῆλον ὡς καθ' εἰμαρμένην καὶ τὸ τῆς δρμῆς γενήσεται, εἰ καὶ ὑφ' ἡμῶν.) Theiler attributes the formulation with *διὰ* to Philopator himself (above, n. 6), p. 66; it may rather be his libertarian critics' way of putting the point.

¹²⁵ Calcidius clxi. 194.23 ff.; 'siquidem necesse sit agi per nos agente fato'. The parallel between Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius is noted by Theiler, op. cit., p. 66 and n. 2; cf. den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 51 f.

with our impulse that we are responsible *and not for those where our impulse is thwarted*¹²⁶ — though the latter point is indeed *implied* by what Alexander says¹²⁷ — and does not, in his objection, lay such emphasis on the point that impulse is a necessary condition of action.¹²⁸ Nemesis emphasizes that our impulse will, for the Stoics, itself be fated;¹²⁹ this is implied in Alexander, but not explicitly stressed, the point rather being that the action is fated.¹³⁰ Whereas Alexander refers to fire heating, Nemesis refers to its burning or rising.¹³¹ And Nemesis attributes the argument to Chrysippus and Philopator (a Stoic of the second century A.D.¹³²) among others; he cannot therefore be wholly dependent on Alexander, for Alexander does not name his source for argument 'A', any more than he names his opponents anywhere in the *de fato*.¹³³ It may therefore be that Nemesis is not drawing on Alexander at all, but independently attacking an argument which he encountered as advanced by Philopator.¹³⁴

It is only Alexander who introduces the example of the *cylinder* into the context of arguments like 'A', and even he does not do so in his formal statement of the argument;¹³⁵ he may have introduced the example, originally associated with a rather different argument,¹³⁶ into a group of examples where it does not belong. (On the other hand, Gellius does in his statement of the cylinder-argument specify that the cylinder is a *stone* one;¹³⁷ compare the example of stone naturally falling which occurs in both Alexander and Nemesis).¹³⁸ Alexander also uses the example of a sphere;¹³⁹ the examples of cylinder, cone, cube, and sphere appear in [Aristotle] *de mundo* 6, in a passage which some

¹²⁶ SVF 2.991, p. 290.29, cf. 34; Sambursky (above, n. 110), pp. 63 f. That men's actions being in accordance with their impulse is a reason for holding them responsible is asserted by Chrysippus ap. Gellius SVF 2.1000, p. 294.27; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 63 n. 5. The freedom of the Stoic sage (rather than responsibility) consists in having a will conformed to fate and hence never thwarted, cf. SVF 3.355, 356, 544, Epictet. Diss. 1.12.9, 2.23.42, 4.1.28 ff. Long, *Problems*, pp. 189 ff. and nn.

¹²⁷ xiii. 181.21, 29, 182.5; cf. *μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος* in 181.27.

¹²⁸ Above, n. 115.

¹²⁹ SVF 2.991, p. 290.33, 39.

¹³⁰ xiii. 182.13–16.

¹³¹ SVF 2.991, p. 290.43, 28 respectively; for fire rising cf. Aristot. *An. Post.* 2.11, 94^b 37 ff. (n. 121), *Eth. Nic.* 2.1 1103^a 19; also Marcus Aurelius 10.32.2 f. For Alexander cf. n. 109.

¹³² Galen, *an. pass.* 31.24 Marquardt (Leipzig, Teubner, 1884); Theiler, op. cit., pp. 66 f. Cf. Gercke, *Jahrb. für klass. Philol.* Supplbd. 14 (1885), 692, 695; Pohlenz (above, n. 41), 2.26, n. 30, 2.160 and n. 3; Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 398 n. 4.

¹³³ Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 247 n. 2, 266.

¹³⁴ Theiler concluded that Philopator was the target of a common source followed

by both Alexander and Nemesis (pp. 66 f.). If the formulation with *διὰ* is *not* Philopator's (above, n. 124) its presence in both Alexander and Nemesis may suggest an anti-determinist common source. (Calcisius, above, n. 125, could have derived it from Alexander, while not taking over argument 'A'.) Alternatively, Alexander and Nemesis (or his source) could have formulated their objection in a similar way independently. Cf. below, § VIII and n. 237; also n. 148.

¹³⁵ Contrast *de fato* xiii. 181.19, 182.8, xiv. 185.3 with xi. 179.15, xix. 189.21, xxxvi. 208.23.

¹³⁶ Above, n. 113.

¹³⁷ SVF 2.1000, p. 294.16. Cf. in general G. Vollgraff, 'De lapide cylindro', *Mnemosyne* 2.52 (1924), 207–11.

¹³⁸ Alexander, *de fato* xiii. 181.19 etc.; Nemesis SVF 2.991, p. 290.27. Cf. Gercke, op. cit. (n. 132), p. 694.

¹³⁹ xxxvi. 208.23; cf. xv. 185.17 ff. (where the text is correct; cf. G. Rodier, 'Conjectures sur le texte du *de fato* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise', *Rev. Phil.* 25 (1901), 67 as against R. Hackforth, 'Notes on some passages of Alexander Aphrodisiensis *de fato*', *CQ* 40 (1946), 38).

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *turbinem*, Cicero, *de fato* 42 fin.; A. Yon, *Cicéron: traité du destin* (Paris, Budé, 1950), pp. 22, 41 f.; Donini (above, n. 110), p. 4.

scholars have connected with Alexander, *de fato* xiii.¹⁴¹ The main point of the *de mundo* passage is the way in which a single force may produce many different effects; but this is not absent either from argument 'A' or from the cylinder-argument.¹⁴² Alexander, or his school, appears to have known and used the *de mundo*;¹⁴³ but the present similarity may perhaps rather be explained by both drawing on a common Stoic source and using it in different ways.

The thesis of determinism, in the form that the same result must always follow in the same circumstances, is stated only by Alexander,¹⁴⁴ Nemesisius in the present passage,¹⁴⁵ and Plotinus¹⁴⁶ (who may well be dependent on Alexander both here and in his allusion to argument 'A'¹⁴⁷). It does not appear in this form in any earlier writer. If Nemesisius is independent of Alexander, the formulation *may* be that of Philopator as their common source. It is not however necessary to suppose that his position differed materially in this respect from that of Chrysippus,¹⁴⁸ for the thesis of determinism in this form is already implied in earlier statements of the determinist position; compare in particular the statement that fate is an inescapable sequence and interweaving of things from infinity (a direct quotation from Chrysippus by Gellius),¹⁴⁹ together with its definition as a sequence of causes and the assertion that whatever happens has always been going to happen (Cicero).¹⁵⁰

In the case of Boethius too there are considerable divergences from Alexander's statement of argument 'A'; like Nemesisius, he stresses the point that our impulse is fated,¹⁵¹ and he seems to see the Stoic argument as depending, like the cylinder argument, on the fact that it is *our* impulse that is involved, rather than on the contrast between living creatures and inanimate objects.¹⁵² His objections,

¹⁴¹ 398b28 ff; W. L. Lorimer, 'Some notes on the text of pseudo-Aristotle *de mundo*' (*St. Andrews University Publications* 21, 1925), pp. 63-5, J. P. Maguire, 'The sources of pseudo-Aristotle *de mundo*', *YCS* 6 (1939), 151 f, comparing with the present passage of Alexander the following example of the different behaviour of different types of creatures when released (*de mundo* 6, 398b30 ff.).

¹⁴² Cf. n. 116; SVF 2.1000, p. 294.2 f., 20 f. Donini, op. cit., pp. 12-15. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 10.33.2 f. (Vollgraff, (above, n. 137), p. 211.)

¹⁴³ Cf. P. Moraux, 'Alexander von Aphrodisias *Quaest.* 2.3', *Hermes* 95 (1967), 160 n. 2, 163.

¹⁴⁴ xxii. 192.22 ff.: ... ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπάντων παριστηκόντων περί τε τὸ αἰτῶν καὶ ὧ ἐστὼν αἰτιον, ὅτε μὲν δὴ μὴ οὕτως ὡς συμβαίνειν, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως. Cf. also xv. 185.7-10, *mantissa* 170.2 ff., 174.3 ff.; Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 250, 262 f. and n. 39.

¹⁴⁵ SVF 2.991, p. 290.36-8: ... τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπάντων παριστηκόντων ... πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ποτὲ μὲν οὕτως ποτὲ δ' ἄλλως γενέσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀποκεκληρώσθαι ταῦτα ...

¹⁴⁶ 3.1, 2.30 ff. (SVF 2.946, p. 273.42-4):

... ἔπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἀεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἀνιέναι, δι' αὐτῶν γινόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γινόμενα, δουλεύειν τε τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα. Cf. Alexander, *de fato* xxii. 192.1-15.

¹⁴⁷ So of the latter I. Bruns, *Interpretationes variae* (Kiel, 1893) 12. Cf. Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 14 (though this refers to Alexander's commentaries, not explicitly to the independent treatises). A. H. Armstrong, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 212; R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972), p. 29; Verbeke, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 50 (1968), 74.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. in general on this Long, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 52 (1970), 268 n. 54, and *Problems*, p. 196 n. 27.

¹⁴⁹ SVF 2.1000, p. 293.30-2: φυσικὴν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὄλων 'εἰς ἑαυτῶν τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μεταπολυμένων ἀπαραβάτου οὐσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς.

¹⁵⁰ SVF 2.921-2. Cf. also Cicero, *de fato* 19-21, SVF 2.917 (Aëtius), 973 (Plutarch).

¹⁵¹ *Comm. ed. sec.* 195.21 ff., 217.25 ff.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* 195.15-21, 217.23-25; cf. above, n. 113. (Cf., however, 'quod ipsa voluntas ex nobis est et secundum animalis naturam', 196.2 f.).

moreover, are confined to the second of Alexander's two points, ignoring (i) above.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, there are sufficient parallels between Boethius and Alexander, especially in this second objection to the determinist argument, to suggest that Boethius is dependent on Alexander whether directly or indirectly; though it may be noted that some of the parallels occur in a later passage in Boethius and not in that which recalls Alexander's statement of 'A'.

Alexander, *de fato* xiv. 184.8–11.

οὕτως γοῦν καὶ ἡδέων τινῶν φαινο-
μένων πολλάκις ἀπέχεται . . .
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ συμφέροντα φανέντα
τινὰ παρητήσατο . . .

id. xiv. 183.22–29.

. . . τί παθόντες ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ τε καὶ
συγκαταθέσει τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν φασ
εἶναι . . . ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ γωόμενον μετὰ
τῆς κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν
συγκαταθέσεως.

id. xxxiii. 205.15 f.

ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα τῶν καθ' ὁρμὴν
γνωμένων τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔχει, ὅσα κατὰ
λογικὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνεργῆται.¹⁵⁴

id. xiv. 184.18–20.

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ [sc. τὸ εἶναι] ἐν τῷ
λογικῷ, ὃ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀρχὴν
ἔχειν τοῦ καὶ ἐλέσθαι τι καὶ μὴ· καὶ τὸ
αὐτὸ ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ τοῦτο ἀναιρῶν
ἀναιρεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον.

id. xv. 185.18–20

διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἔπεται
ταῖς ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ περιστώσαις
αἰτίας, ὃ δ' ἀνθρώπος οὐχ, ὅτι ἐστὶν
αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἔχειν ἀρχὴν τε
καὶ αἰτίαν ἐν αὐτῷ, <ὥς> μὴ πάντως
ἔπεσθαι τοῖς περιστώσω ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ.

id. xiii. 181.14.

λέγουσιν ἐφ' ἡμῶν εἶναι τὸ γωόμενον

Boethius, *in de int. comm. ed. sec.*
196.19–197.4 Meiser.

atque ideo quaedam dulcia et specimen
utilitatis monstrantia spernimus,
quaedam amara licet nolentes tamen
fortiter sustinemus; adeo non in
voluntate, sed in iudicatione volun-
tatis liberum consistat arbitrium . . .

atque ideo quarundam actionum nos
ipsi principia, non sequaces sumus . . .
quam [sc. iudicationem] si quis ex
rebus tollat, rationem hominis sustulerit,
hominis ratione sublata nec ipsa quoque
humanitas permanebit.

id. 217.23–25.

sed illa esse sola in nobis et ex volun-

¹⁵³ 196.3–197.4; above, n. 117. (At 218.8 ff. Boethius objects that if our will is subject to fate it cannot be free; but he does not explicitly make the point that the Stoic theory does away with any meaningful difference between living creatures and

inanimate objects, at least from a libertarian point of view.)

¹⁵⁴ For the contrast between ὁρμή and λογικὴ ὁρμή cf. also Alexander, *quaest.* iii.13, 107.6 ff., etc.

καὶ δι' ἡμῶν.

id. xiii. 182.12 f.

τὰς διὰ τῶν ζώων ὑπὸ τῆς
εἰμαρμένης γινομένης [sc. κυήσεις
καὶ ἐνεργείας] ἐπὶ τοῖς ζώοις εἶναι
λέγουσιν.¹⁵⁵

id. xiii. 181.10–12.

ὥς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς τύχης ἄλλο τι
σημαινόμενον ὑποθέντες τῷ τῆς
τύχης ὀνόματι παράγειν πειρῶνται τοὺς
ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν . . . οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ποιῶσιν.¹⁵⁶

id. xv. 185.12–14.

διὰ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξουσίαν ἐστὶ τι
ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ὅτι τῶν οὕτως γνομένων
ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν κύριοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξωθεν
τις αἰτία.

tate nostra, quaecumque per voluntatem
nostram et *per nos ipsos vis fati complet*
ac perficit.

id. 218.5–12.

quare hoc modo *significationem*
liberi arbitrii permutantes necessitatem
et id quod in nobis est coniungere
impossibiliter et copulare contendunt
. . . quorundamque nos *domini* quod-
ammodo sumus vel faciendi vel non
faciendi.

It is clear that Boethius knew of Alexander's commentary on the *de interpretatione*,¹⁵⁷ probably through that of Porphyry.¹⁵⁸ Théry has suggested that he did not know of the *de fato* because he nowhere mentions Alexander's distinctive doctrine of fate,¹⁵⁹ but this is not perhaps a very strong argument, Alexander's own positive doctrine of fate not being his most important contribution to the discussion of the problem of determinism.¹⁶⁰ If Boethius in the passages cited above is dependent, not on the *de fato*, but on similar passages in Alexander's *de interpretatione* commentary, the latter can hardly have been confined to narrowly logical concerns as Théry supposes;¹⁶¹ alternatively, Porphyry may have incorporated material from the *de fato* into his own *de interpretatione* commentary together with that from the commentary by Alexander.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. above, nn. 116, 124.

¹⁵⁶ For the complaint that the Stoics interpret τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν in their own idiosyncratic sense cf. Alexander, *de fato* xiv. 182.29, also xxxviii. 211.31; Plotinus 3.1, 7.15 (above, n. 120).

¹⁵⁷ E. Zeller, *A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy*, tr. S. F. Alleyne (London, 1883), pp. 319 f. n. 1; cf. below, n. 224.

¹⁵⁸ That Ammonius and Boethius knew Alexander's *de interpretatione* commentary through that of Porphyry is argued by R. Beutler, art. 'Porphyrios (21)', *RE* 22.1 (1953), 284; for the influence of Porphyry on Ammonius and Boethius cf. P. Merlan, 'Ammonius Hermiae, Zacharias Scholasticus and Boethius', *GRBS* 9 (1968), 199 f.; also

den Boeft, op. cit., p. 134, Frede, op. cit. (n. 79), p. 26 n. 1. J. Shiel, 'Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle', *Med. and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958), 217–44, argues that Porphyry was the intermediary between Alexander and Boethius' commentaries on *de int.* (231) but holds that Boethius' knowledge of Porphyry was not direct but from scholia combining Porphyrian with later material (pp. 231–4, cf. pp. 227, 242–4).

¹⁵⁹ G. Théry (above, n. 22) p. 17 and n. 2.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. the comment of Proclus, *in Tim.* 3.272.7 ff. Diehl that Alexander's doctrine of fate is not in accord with the common notions of men on the subject (cf. *mantissa* 186.9–13); and above, n. 76.

¹⁶¹ loc. cit.

V

In *de fato* xi Alexander argues against determinism from man's power of deliberation: deliberation is incompatible with determinism, being concerned with what can be otherwise, but nature has given man the power of deliberation, and none of the primary¹⁶² (as opposed to incidental) results of nature is in vain,¹⁶³ as his opponents too agree.¹⁶⁴ The argument also appears in the last section of the *mantissa*.¹⁶⁵

This argument is also found in Ammonius¹⁶⁶ and in Boethius;¹⁶⁷ it is less closely linked in the latter than in Alexander and Ammonius with the claim that the power of deliberation is the peculiar characteristic of man,¹⁶⁸ but this is asserted elsewhere in Boethius' commentary.¹⁶⁹ Nemesius argues that deliberation, man's superior faculty,¹⁷⁰ will be superfluous (*περιττόν*) if all is determined,¹⁷¹ but does not make the explicit connection with the principle that *nature* does nothing in vain; this seems to be an abbreviated version of the same argument. Calcidius however, while implying that deliberation is incompatible with determinism,¹⁷² has nothing further resembling the present argument. A general point of contact between Alexander and both Nemesius and Calcidius is the connection between responsibility (in a libertarian sense) and reason.¹⁷³

Another application of the principle that nature does nothing in vain is seen in the assertion, appearing both in the last section of the *mantissa*¹⁷⁴ and in Boethius,¹⁷⁵ that those things which are always in the same state have no potentiality for receiving the opposite; for if they had such a capacity they would do so in vain. Boethius here adds the qualification that none of the *primary* results of nature is in vain, which is not found in the passage of the *mantissa*

¹⁶² προηγουμένων, xi. 178.12; for the term cf. SVF 2.1156–7, Epictetus, *diss.* 2.8.6. Verbeke, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 50 (1968), 87 n. 47. Alexander allows that there are some things that are not 'for the sake of anything' (τῶς χάριν or ἕνεκά του, cf. v. 169.2): iv. 167.22–168.2, v. 168.26 f.

¹⁶³ xi. 178.8–180.2. For nature doing nothing in vain cf. Aristotle, *de caelo* 1.4, 271^a33, *Politics* 1.2, 1253^a9, 1.8, 1256^b20.

¹⁶⁴ xi. 179.24; cf. Verbeke, loc. cit. So also at Ammonius, *in de int.* 148.19 (below, n. 166).

¹⁶⁵ *mantissa* 183.15 ff.

¹⁶⁶ *in de int.* 148.11 ff. For another parallel between Alexander and Ammonius cf. Ammonius 150.23 f., ἀπερ δηλονότι καὶ ἐναργῶς ἄλογα καὶ τὸν ὅλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄρδην ἀνατρέπει βίον, with Alexander *de fato* xvi. 186.18 f. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῖς ἀναφοῦσιν τὸ εἶναι τι οὕτως ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔπεται τὸ συγγεῖν καὶ ἀνατρέπειν, ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον; though the general idea is admittedly a commonplace (cf. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 573 f., and especially John Chrysostom, *hom.* 8, *Patr. Gr.* 63.510.33 f. (ibid. 517)).

¹⁶⁷ *comm. ed. sec.* 220.8 ff.

¹⁶⁸ Alexander, *de fato* xi. 178.12, *mantissa* 183.25–9 (cf. also ibid. 172.19 ff., 173.6 ff.); Ammonius, *in de int.* 142.17–20.

¹⁶⁹ Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 196.26 ff.

¹⁷⁰ xxxix. 764 b.

¹⁷¹ loc. cit.; cf. xli. 773 c–776 a. For the parallel with Alexander cf. Domański (above, n. 20), pp. 152 f. and n. 1; A. Siclari, *L'antropologia di Nemesio de Emesa*, (Padua, 1974), p. 244 and n. 33.

¹⁷² Calcidius clxiii. 196.3, compared with Alexander, *de fato* xi. 178.8 ff. by Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96.

¹⁷³ Above, nn. 117, 154; Verbeke (above, n. 162), p. 90 n. 57. Nemesius xli. 773 b–776 a; Domański, op. cit., pp. 166 f. Calcidius, clvi. 190.12 f., compared with Alexander, *de fato* xi. 178. 17 ff., xiv. 183.30 ff., xv. 186.3 ff. by Switalski, p. 95, Waszink, p. 190.13n.; however, the point preceding this passage in Calcidius, the link between responsibility and that sub-class of the contingent that can equally well happen or not, is absent from Alexander (cf. n. 84).

¹⁷⁴ *mantissa* 184.14–18.

¹⁷⁵ *comm. ed. sec.* 236.11–16; cf. Sharples, *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 248 n. 3.

containing *this* argument but is found both in the *de fato* and in the *mantissa* in the argument concerning deliberation.¹⁷⁶ Both in Boethius and in the *mantissa* the examples given are of what never happens to a *type* of thing;¹⁷⁷ this suggests a restriction of the 'principle of plenitude' — that which never happens is impossible — similar to that suggested for Aristotle by Hintikka, so that what never happens to any thing of a given type is impossible for each thing of that type, but what never in fact happens to *this* individual thing is still possible for it, provided that it sometimes happens to *other* things of the same type.¹⁷⁸

In his commentaries on *de interpretatione* 9 Boethius operates with a classification of the contingent into free will, chance, and the possible.¹⁷⁹ This may be suggested by the plan of the *de fato*, where chance, the contingent, and free human action are discussed successively¹⁸⁰ and where chance, the contingent, and responsibility appear as a list.¹⁸¹ It is true that in the Platonist tradition too responsibility, chance, the possible, and the contingent appear as a list in pseudo-Plutarch;¹⁸² but the contingent is here a subdivision of the possible, and responsibility is concerned with a subdivision of the contingent.¹⁸³

VI

In *de fato* xxx Alexander rejects the argument to determinism from universal divine foreknowledge; it would be more reasonable, he implies, while retaining the principle that the gods cannot have foreknowledge of the contingent — on which indeed the determinist argument depends¹⁸⁴ — to argue that, as not everything is necessary, the gods do not have foreknowledge of everything.¹⁸⁵ He does however suggest — though only hypothetically, his concern being to refute his opponents rather than to establish a position of his own — that the gods have foreknowledge of the contingent in a sense, foreknowledge of the contingent *as contingent*.¹⁸⁶

Proclus contrasts his own view, that the gods have definite foreknowledge of the indefinite and contingent,¹⁸⁷ the nature of knowledge depending on that of

¹⁷⁶ Alexander, *de fato* xi. 178.11 (n. 162), *mantissa* 183.26; Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 236.16 (*proprium*).

¹⁷⁷ *mantissa* 184.18 ff., Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 236.5 ff., cf. 237.24 f.

¹⁷⁸ J. Hintikka, *Time and Necessity* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100, 171 ff.

¹⁷⁹ *comm. ed. pr.* 120.1, *ed. sec.* 190.1, 14, 203.4, 240.5.

¹⁸⁰ Chs. viii, ix–x, and xi ff. respectively.

¹⁸¹ *de fato* xxiv. 194.23–5; cf. also *mantissa* 184.27 ff. (coming just after a discussion of the contingent), 183.1–8. Contrast *de fato* vii. 172.4 ff. where only chance and the contingent are mentioned.

¹⁸² Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f; Dillon (above, n. 7), p. 323.

¹⁸³ Above, nn. 79, 101; cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 f. The threefold division of the contingent (n. 79) does also appear in Boethius; cf. *comm. ed. pr.* 120.24 ff., *ed. sec.* 188.4, 192.16, 240.8, 248.20.

¹⁸⁴ xxx. 200.28–201.6, 201.21–4. Cf.

Cicero, *de div.* 2.15 ff., 25, *de fato* 32; A. S. Pease, *Cicero: de divinatione* (Chicago, 1920–3), pp. 372 ff.

¹⁸⁵ xxx. 201.24–9. With Alexander's strategy in this argument cf. Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 225.17 ff., 21 ff.; but his position is in fact different (cf. n. 193). On Alexander's argument cf. P. Huber, *Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* (Zürich, 1976), pp. 13 f.

¹⁸⁶ xxx. 201.13–18, cf. 201.28 ff., and 200.25–7 where the possibility that there is a type of foreknowledge that is compatible with contingency is perhaps kept open (ἐἰ γάρ).

¹⁸⁷ *de prov.* 63.8 ff., *dec. dub.* q.2, 7.28, 8.9 (these works cited by reference to the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke in H. Boese, *Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula*, Berlin 1960 (*Quell. u. Stud. zur Gesch. der Philos.* 1)), *El. Theol.* 93, 124, in *Tim.*

the knower and not on that of the thing known,¹⁸⁸ with, on the one hand, the Stoic view according to which everything is necessary and hence known as such, and on the other the view of 'the Peripatetics' for whom God has only *indefinite* knowledge of the contingent.¹⁸⁹ It seems certain that it is the present chapter of Alexander that Proclus has in mind;¹⁹⁰ and, though Alexander does not himself use the terms 'definite' and 'indefinite', Proclus takes his 'foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent' in the sense of *indefinite* foreknowledge. That is, in the case of what is contingent the gods know, for Alexander, (1) that it is possible for me to do a thing and also not for me to do it, but *not* (2) that I will as a matter of fact do it (or not do it) even though I could do otherwise. (2) is in fact Proclus' own position, involving a rejection of the principle, attributed by Alexander both to his opponents and to himself, that the gods cannot have (definite) foreknowledge of the contingent.¹⁹¹ Alexander's expression 'foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent' and his argument that to know the contingent not as contingent but as necessary would not in fact be to know it at all¹⁹² are in themselves ambiguous, and are found elsewhere applied to views of type (2) as well as to those of type (1);¹⁹³ nevertheless, Proclus' interpretation of his (tentative) position in terms of (1) seems the correct and natural one.¹⁹⁴

A similar view to (1), that God has only indefinite knowledge of the contingent, appears in Calcidius¹⁹⁵ and in Porphyry, who is criticized for it by Proclus.¹⁹⁶ It seems likely that they are both dependent on Alexander. Waszink argued that

1.352.5–27 Diehl, in *Parm.* 1.956.10 ff. especially 957.18 ff. Cousin; cf. Iamblichus ap. Ammonius in *de int.* 9, 135.12 ff., Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 225.21 ff., 226.12 f., *cons. phil.* 5.3–6, Psellus, *de omnif. doct.* 17.7, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summ. Theol.* Ia q. 14 art. 13, *Summa contra Gentiles* I.67. H. R. Patch, 'Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists', *Speculum* 10 (1935), 399; Theiler, op. cit., pp. 51 f.; E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology*² (Oxford, 1963), pp. 266 f.; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 53–6; Wallis (above, n. 147), p. 149; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 45 ff. In Proclus himself, however, the emphasis is not on *foreknowledge* and the problem of freedom so much as on that of divine knowledge of what is indefinite, subject to change and infinite, except in *de prov.* On the relation between the solutions of Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius cf. Huber, pp. 20–59.

¹⁸⁸ Proclus, *de prov.* 64, *dec. dub.* q.2, 7.10 ff., *El. Theol.* 124, in *Tim.* 1.352.15, in *Parm.* 1.956.10 ff.; Iamblichus ap. Ammonius 135.15 ff., 136.1 ff. especially 11, Boethius *cons. phil.* 5 pr.4.72 ff., pr.6.1 ff., 59 ff., Psellus, op. cit. 17.1 ff., Aquinas, *Summ. Theol.* Ia q.14 art.13 ad 2. Patch (above, n. 187), p. 399 and n. 4, Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 122 f., Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 40 ff.

¹⁸⁹ *de prov.* 63.1–5, cf. *dec. dub.* q.2, 6.3 ff. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4; F. P. Hager, 'Proklos und Alexander von

Aphrodisias über ein Problem der Vorsehung', *Kephalaion: Studies . . . presented to C. J. de Vogel* (Assen, 1975), pp. 171–82. Huber, op. cit., pp. 22 f.

¹⁹⁰ So Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4; Hager op. cit., pp. 175–8; Huber, op. cit., 22 and n. 8 (but cf. below, n. 193). Cf. Wallis (above, n. 147), p. 149.

¹⁹¹ Above, n. 184; cf. Huber, p. 42 n. 18.

¹⁹² *de fato* xxx. 201.12–16.

¹⁹³ Proclus *dec. dub.* q.2, 8.10 ff., Boethius *comm. ed. sec.* 225.25 ff. (wrongly assimilated to (1) by Huber, p. 18 n. 45, who fails to observe that it is explicitly stated that God does know the outcome (226.12 f.) — that is, it would seem from the context, *how men will choose*, not just what will happen if they choose in a certain way). Cf. also *cons. phil.* 5 pr.6.93; and for the application to a view of type (1), Calcidius clxii. 195.6 (below, n. 194).

¹⁹⁴ So Huber, p. 14. View (2) is after all paradoxical (*ibid.*, pp. 45, 59) and is only naturally advanced as a reaction to (1). Cf. especially Alexander, *de fato* xxx. 201.18–21.

¹⁹⁵ clxii. 195.2 ff.; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 53 ff., Huber, pp. 18 f. The parallel with Alexander is also noted by Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3.

¹⁹⁶ Porphyry ap. Proclus, in *Tim.* 1.352.12. Den Boeft and Huber, *loc. cit.*

Calcidius derived much of his material from Numenius¹⁹⁷ and did so through Porphyry,¹⁹⁸ and that material in Calcidius which appears to derive from Alexander reflects Porphyry's use of the latter.¹⁹⁹ In his edition of Calcidius, indeed, Waszink associates the discussion in ch. clxii, where the reference to indefinite foreknowledge occurs, with other passages in Calcidius concerned with prophecy which he argues derive from Numenius, in view of the use in them of examples from the Old Testament and of the term *salubritas*;²⁰⁰ however, Porphyry may well have combined the foreknowledge doctrine from Alexander with other material from Numenius, and indeed Waszink does not suggest that ch. xlxi itself reflects the latter.²⁰¹ Moreover, he subsequently expressed approval of den Boeft's suggestion that the Old Testament references in Calcidius derive not from Numenius but (whether directly or through Porphyry) from Origen's commentary on Genesis.²⁰²

Theiler attributes the doctrine of foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent (in sense (1)) to Gaius; but his grounds for doing so seem questionable. The connection between *responsibility* and the contingent, found in Albinus and pseudo-Plutarch,²⁰³ is indeed involved in Alexander's general position,²⁰⁴ but there is no very close parallel in the latter to pseudo-Plutarch's *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ὕλη τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν προῦποκεῖσθαι*,²⁰⁵ and, even if there were, this is scarcely a firm ground on which to attribute to Gaius Alexander's doctrine of *foreknowledge* of the contingent, which does not occur in Albinus, Apuleius, or pseudo-Plutarch. Elsewhere Theiler refers to the appearance of the doctrine of indefinite foreknowledge of the contingent in Alexander and Calcidius together with that of the division of the possible into necessary and contingent in pseudo-Plutarch;²⁰⁶ but, again, the latter point does not appear in this systematic form in Alexander.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁷ Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. xxxviii–lxxxii; on fate cf. especially lviii–lxii. (However, cf. above, n. 6).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. lxii f., lxxx f. For Calcidius' use of Porphyry cf. ibid., pp. xc–xcv; J. C. M. van Winden, *Calcidius on Matter (Philosophia antiqua 9, Leiden, 1959)*, p. 247; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 131–7; Waszink, 'Calcidius: Nachträge zum Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum', *Jahrb. für Antike und Christentum* 15 (1972), 240 f. *Contra*, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 401–4.

¹⁹⁹ Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. lxiii, lxxxvi, xc, cii; cf. den Boeft, p. 134.

²⁰⁰ Waszink, pp. 1x f.; Calcidius clxxi. 200.14 ff., clvii. 191.12 respectively. For Old Testament references as a sign of Numenian influence cf. Waszink, pp. xlii–xliv, lxxviii f., lxxxvii; Dillon, p. 405. Waszink at first argued that they could not come through Porphyry, (pp. xlii n. 2, cv) but later revised his position (*Entretiens Hardt* 12 (1965), 61. f. and n. 1; den Boeft, p. 135). Cf. however below, n. 202.

²⁰¹ Waszink, introduction to edition of

Calcidius, p. lxi. Cf. den Boeft, pp. 71 and 128 f. Den Boeft himself connects the doctrine of foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent, both in Calcidius and in Porphyry, with *Timaeus* 29 bc and Porphyry's commentary on that work, rather than with Alexander (den Boeft, pp. 53–6); it is true that this might seem to be supported by the absence of any specific reference to foreknowledge in the Porphyry passage, but this might only reflect its being reported by Proclus (cf. above, n. 187).

²⁰² Den Boeft, pp. 135 f.; Waszink, *Jahrb. für Antike und Christentum* 15 (1972), 236–44.

²⁰³ Albinus, *Didasc.* xxvi. 179.28, pseudo-Plutarch 570 F (above, n. 79). Theiler, op. cit., p. 74 and n. 6: followed in the attribution to Gaius by Huber (above, n. 185), p. 18 n. 44.

²⁰⁴ Above, n. 83.

²⁰⁵ Cf. also Albinus 179.29. Above, n. 84.

²⁰⁶ Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3; above, n. 78.

²⁰⁷ Above, pp. 250–1.

VII

Both Ammonius and Boethius interpret Aristotle's position concerning the truth of future contingents as follows: before the event, of two propositions, one asserting that it will occur and the other that it will not, one is true and the other false, *but neither definitely*.²⁰⁸ This is to be contrasted with the view that predictions of future contingent events do not have any truth value at all before the event, a view which is attributed to Epicurus (and not to Aristotle) by Cicero,²⁰⁹ and which Boethius emphatically denies was Aristotle's view though some, including the Stoics, said that it was.²¹⁰ (The view that future contingents have truth values, but indefinite ones, is it would seem given as the Peripatetic view by Simplicius, too, in reply to the position of Nicostratus.²¹¹ Simplicius' expression is indeed ambiguous between this and the view that future contingents have no truth-values at all,²¹² but if he intended the latter his 'Peripatetic' position would only differ from Nicostratus' by denying that a statement can be regarded as neither true nor false just because it is not either *yet*. There is however no indication that this is the point at issue.²¹³) The view of Ammonius and Boethius is also to be contrasted with the modern view that Aristotle in *de interpretatione* 9 is only denying the *necessary* truth of future contingents, and not their *truth*;²¹⁴ Ammonius and Boethius are not it seems prepared to admit the unqualified truth of the prediction, which they regard, rightly or wrongly, as involving the necessity of the event.²¹⁵ This is not the place to discuss the merits of their view as an interpretation of the Aristotelian text; it may be noted, however, that Aristotle nowhere uses the terms 'definitely'

²⁰⁸ Ammonius, *in de int.* 131.2–4, 138.16 f., 139.14 f., etc.; Boethius, *comm. ed. pr.* 106.30, 115.5, etc., *comm. ed. sec.* 191.5, 208.11 ff., 215.21 ff., 245.9, 246.12, 219.29. Cf. J. Lukasiewicz, 'Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of propositional logic', in *Polish Logic 1920–1939* (ed. S. McCall, Oxford, 1967), p. 64; W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1963), p. 190 n. 3; Frede (above, n. 79) pp. 24–7, 69; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 38 f. and n. 6.

²⁰⁹ *de fato* 21, 28, 37; *Ac. Pr.* 97. Cf. also *de nat. deorum* 1.70. Lukasiewicz, loc. cit.; Verbeke, *Arch. Gesch. Philos.* 50 (1968), 86 n. 42; Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* p. 116 n. 1.

²¹⁰ *comm. ed. sec.* 208.1; cf. 215.6. Lukasiewicz, loc. cit. It is clear that Aristotle did hold that the *disjunction* 'either there will be a sea-battle or there won't be' is true; *de int.* 9 19 a 28, Ammonius, *in de int.* 154.7 ff. Compare Cicero, *de fato* 37, *Ac. Pr.* 97 (last n.).

²¹¹ Simplicius, *in cat.* 406.6 ff.; Lukasiewicz, loc. cit. I am grateful to Dr. R. Sorabji for this reference.

²¹² 407.7 and 407.12 suggest the latter; but 407.6 f. implies that the future-tense disjuncts do already have truth values, and the contrast drawn in 407.10 is with past-

tense statements which are *definitely* true or false.

²¹³ Cf. also Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26.

²¹⁴ This is interpretation (1) in J. Ackrill, *Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 133, 139 f., and the 'Non-Standard Interpretation' of V. R. McKim, 'Fatalism and the Future: Aristotle's Way Out', *Rev. Met.* 25 (1972), 83 and n. 7. So L. Linsky, 'Professor David Williams on Aristotle', *Philos. Rev.* 63 (1954), 250–2; G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle and the Sea-Battle', in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), *Aristotle (Modern Studies in Philosophy series, London, 1968)*, p. 24; C. Strang, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle', *Mind* 69 (1960), 454, 459 ff.

²¹⁵ Cf. especially Ammonius, *in de int.* 145.9 ff., Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 212.8 ff., 213.12 (The point is *not* just that *we* cannot know and so cannot justifiably say which alternative will occur; cf. *comm. ed. sec.* 192.5 ff., 197.18 ff., 208.17 ff., 245.19 ff.). Contrast the position of Carneades (Cicero, *de fato* 19 f., 27 f., 31–3, 37 f.) and of Gilbert Ryle (*Dilemmas*, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 15–35); A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, pp. 162 f.

and 'indefinitely', though something like the position of Ammonius and Boethius *could* be understood from *de interpretatione* 9, 19^a36–8.²¹⁶

The contrast between definite and (by implication) indefinite truth in the discussion of future contingents, and the association only of the former with a determinist position, first appears, to my knowledge, in the last section of one of the *quaestiones* attributed to Alexander, 1.4.²¹⁷ Bruns argued that this *quaestio* reflects a series of accretions rather than being a single work;²¹⁸ and it is only in the last section that the qualification 'definitely' appears.

Alexander does not himself in the *de fato* discuss the question of the truth of future contingents *as such*. He does on several occasions indicate that for his opponents, for whom everything is determined, all predictions *are* to be true or false;²¹⁹ but, just because these discussions are concerned with the position if everything *is* determined,²²⁰ no necessary conclusion can be drawn as to whether Alexander himself holds that the truth of a prediction is itself incompatible with the contingency of the event.²²¹ The same applies, it would seem, to the earlier three sections of *quaest.* 1.4 itself.²²² It does however seem unlikely that, if Alexander held that future contingents *are* true or false, though indefinitely, he would simply assert that predictions are true or false on his opponents' position without indicating that they were also true or false — though in a different sense — in his own view.²²³ This suggests that he did, at the time of writing the *de fato*, hold that future contingents are neither true nor false, and that the author of the last section of *quaest.* 1.4 — whether it is Alexander himself at a later date, or a pupil — was the originator of the later view, perhaps as a reaction to those Stoics who took Aristotle to be denying that future contingents had truth values at all.²²⁴

²¹⁶ Cf. Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 71 ff. Ammonius adds 'definitely' in commenting on 18^b4 (141.20), Boethius on 18^a34 (*ed. pr.* 108.23, *ed. sec.* 204.24); its absence is however felt at *ed. sec.* 232.15 and at *ibid.* 249.5 (19^a39). Cf. Lukasiewicz, *loc. cit.*

²¹⁷ 12.16, 18, 13.5. Frede, *p.* 26.

²¹⁸ I. Bruns, 'Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias — I. Der Begriff des Möglichen und die Stoa', *Rh.Mus.* 44 (1889), 624 f.

²¹⁹ *de fato* x: 177.15 ff., xvi. 187.22 f., xvii. 188.3 f.

²²⁰ Cf. especially x. 177.28 f.: the truth of the prediction implies the event's being fated *εἴ γε πάντα τὰ γινόμενα καθ' ἐμπαρμένην*. The whole discussion from 177.7 has been in the context of an argument advanced by determinists.

²²¹ Nor is xxvii. 197.11–15 necessarily decisive, for the reference is not just to the question of future truth but rather to the unalterability of a character once established (cf. nn. 53, 75). Alexander need only be asserting that it is true before the character is fixed to say 'the man *may* become so-and-so', but not afterwards; there *need* not be any reference to the truth or otherwise of

'he *will* become so-and-so'. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Alexander would have expressed himself in precisely this way if he *had* held that the contingency of the event was compatible with the truth of the prediction (see below).

²²² § 2, 11.10, 17; cf. § 3, 12.8 ff. Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26. Unless the reference to physical determinism is carried over from § 1 to § 2 (*contra* Bruns, *loc. cit.*) the reference to prevention in 11.4 f., not taken up elsewhere in § 2, seems out of place.

²²³ *A fortiori*, he would be unlikely to do this if he held that predictions of future contingents could be true or false *simpliciter* (cf. Carneades and Ryle cited in n. 215).

²²⁴ Boethius, *comm. ed. sec.* 219.29 ff. cites Alexander with approval as saying that, in the case of things which admit of change, it is not necessary for one contradictory always to be true and the other false. Boethius at least must have understood this as asserting that it is not always the *same* one of a pair of contradictories that is true, rather than as saying that it is sometimes the case that neither is true or false; for he himself would reject the latter assertion (cf. above, n. 210).

VIII

It seems, then, that there is little reason to assimilate Alexander closely to the Middle-Platonic tradition of writings on fate as represented by Albinus, Apuleius, and pseudo-Plutarch, and that more emphasis should be placed on the contrasts between his treatise and theirs than has often been the case. There are passages which recall Alexander's *de fato* in Plotinus, Ammonius (though in this case only a few parallels have been noted), and Boethius; in the case of the latter two Porphyry, and specifically his commentary on the *de interpretatione*, is a probable intermediary.

The cases of Calcidius and Nemesius seem more doubtful. Switalski and Waszink have collected numerous parallels between Calcidius and Alexander;²²⁵ however, many of these are points of detail which do not in themselves seem very conclusive, and some of the similarities are not all that close. (The situation is rather different from that in the passages from Boethius cited in § IV, for there Alexander seems to have influenced Boethius' whole train of thought; it is this type of parallel sustained throughout an entire passage that seems generally absent where Calcidius and Alexander are concerned.) However, Calcidius' doctrine of divine foreknowledge does seem to derive from Alexander, and elsewhere too Calcidius, or his source, may well be drawing on Alexander, though incorporating material taken from the latter into a structure of his own rather than adopting his arguments wholesale. Here too Porphyry is a possible intermediary.²²⁶

In the case of Nemesius, however, the evidence for any influence by Alexander seems rather more tenuous than in that of Calcidius. Nemesius certainly draws on Peripatetic material,²²⁷ and this may explain similarities between his discussion and some of the *ethica problemata* attributed to Alexander, as well as with the *de fato*;²²⁸ but these parallels do not seem any closer than those between Nemesius and other Peripatetic texts.²²⁹ Nemesius' statement of the Stoic doctrine of

²²⁵ In addition to those already cited in nn. 19 f., 26, 49, 63–70, 125, 173, and 195, cf. Alexander, *de fato* vii. 171.18–20, ἡ δὲ κατασκευὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔσται φανερωτέρα παρατιθέντων ἡμῶν ταῖς προηγουμέναις τῶν κεμένων ἀποδείξεω τὰ ἐπόμενα ἀτοπα τοῖς πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεσθαι λέγουσιν, with Calcidius. clx. 193.15–17, 'sed quia sunt aliquanta quae contra haec e diverso dicuntur, proponenda sunt et diluenda; tunc demum enim firmis erit fundamentis locata Platonis sententia' (Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Waszink ad loc.). Waszink also compares Calcidius clxiii. 195.20 ff. with Alexander, *de fato* xxxiv. 206.5 ff. (ad loc.); but it may be remarked that the latter picks up 205.29, which is part of an argument attributed by Alexander to his determinist opponents (above, n. 111).

²²⁶ Above, n. 199. Den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 134, argues that there are Aristotelian elements in Calcidius derived from Porphyry other than those owed by the latter to

Alexander.

²²⁷ Cf. especially Koch (above, n. 21), pp. 26 f., 32 ff., and 40, pointing out that there are parallels with Aspasius and Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* 3 (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 19/1 and 20 respectively) rather than with Aristotle himself; also Siclari (above, n. 171), p. 232 and n. 18, Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 559 f., Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 413. On *Porphyry* as a source for Nemesius cf. Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, p. lxxiii and n. 1, den Boeft, p. 98, and W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 61 ff.

²²⁸ Cf. Domański (above, n. 20), pp. 133, 136, 138 ff., 142–7, 151 f., 158 f. nn.; Koch, pp. 24, 30–2, 38–41, 44.

²²⁹ Nemesius xxxiv. 737 a – 740 a seems closer to Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* 149.14 ff. than to Alexander, *de fato* xi. 180.9 ff. and *probl. eth.* xxix. 160.5 ff. (Domański, p. 146 n. 1); cf. also Aspasius, in *Eth. Nic.* 71.16 ff. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.3, 1112a21 ff. is clearly the starting-point for all these pass-

responsibility appears to be independent of Alexander's *de fato*,²³⁰ and he seems to know nothing of Alexander's distinctive doctrine of fate²³¹ or of his doctrine of providence as concerned with species,²³² interpreting Aristotle rather in the earlier manner as limiting providence to the superlunary.²³³ We are left with the arguments concerning the incompatibility of determinism with praise and blame, divine providence and law,²³⁴ and also with deliberation,²³⁵ and the general connection between responsibility and reason;²³⁶ these do not seem very firm grounds on which to assert any detailed influence of Alexander on Nemesius.²³⁷

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ages; and there do not seem to be any points of similarity between those in Nemesius and Alexander that cannot be explained by their ultimately deriving from this same Aristotelian original. The definition of the voluntary at Alexander, *probl. eth.* xxix. 159.20 f. is almost exactly repeated in Nemesius xxxii. 729 b; but it is already in Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 3.1, 1111^a22 ff. (to which Nemesius is slightly closer than Alexander). (Koch, op. cit., p. 30). Nemesius, *ibid.*, makes the point that the voluntary is opposed both to the involuntary through ignorance and to the involuntary through force, which is discussed as a logical problem in Alexander, *probl. eth.* xi. 131.18 ff. (Domański, p. 138 n. 1); cf. however Aspasius, in *Eth. Nic.* 65.33 ff.

²³⁰ Above, n. 134.

²³¹ Cf. n. 73; admittedly this is not a strong argument in itself, cf. text at n. 160 above.

²³² Above, n. 86.

²³³ Nemesius xlv. 797 a, contrasting providence and sublunary nature, whereas for Alexander providence, fate, and nature are identical or closely linked (Zeller, (above, n. 157), p. 330; Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, p. 198; Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics*, 224. Admittedly, Alexander's doctrine of providence does not appear in the *de fato*, and Nemesius' knowledge of

Alexander's works may have been incomplete.). Cf. Atticus fr.3, especially 43 ff., 71 ff., and fr. 8.10 ff. Baudry (Paris, Budé, 1931); Aëtius 2.3.4, D. L. 5.32, Arius Didymus, *fr. phys.* 9, Critolaus fr.15 p. 52 Wehrli. Moraux, 'L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce', *Rev. Philos. de Louvain* 47 (1949), 33 f., and *D'Aristote à Bessarion* (Laval, 1907), pp. 54 ff.; H. Happ, 'Weltbild und Seinslehre bei Aristoteles', *Antike und Abendland* 14 (1968), 77 ff.; Todd, op. cit., p. 213.

²³⁴ Above, nn. 63, 64, 66; cf. n. 69.

²³⁵ Above, n. 171.

²³⁶ Above, n. 173.

²³⁷ Amand suggests (above, n. 8), p. 560) that Nemesius xxix-xli in its entirety is derived from a Peripatetic commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* which incorporated an attack on various theories of fate, chs. xxxv-xxxviii being based on this. This commentary might then be the source, attacking Philopator by name, which may be reflected both in Alexander's *de fato* and in Nemesius (above, n. 134). Alexander might himself have named Philopator in a commentary where he did not do so in the *de fato*; but there is no evidence that Alexander wrote a commentary on the *Ethics*, though the *ethica problemata* suggest interest in that work in his school.